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And Not a Drop to Drink: Admiralty Law and the BP 
Well Blowout  
John Costonis∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an earlier Essay, I questioned whether the BP Macondo well 
blowout qualifies as an admiralty tort.1 The blowout scenario 
features BP’s exploratory oil and gas well and Transocean’s 
Deepwater Horizon, a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU). I 
appreciated then as now that my approach to the question’s 
resolution diverges from a framework (Fifth Circuit Model) 
employed by commentators and federal courts within the Federal 
Fifth Circuit to assess torts occasioned by injuries or deaths of 
workers atop Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas drilling 
platforms.  
Confirmation appeared shortly thereafter in Professor David 
Robertson’s reply essay2 and in the Federal Eastern District of 
Louisiana’s opinion in the BP MDL B-1 Bundle Order and Ruling 
(B-1 Bundle).3  
Both look to the Fifth Circuit Model to characterize the 
blowout as an admiralty event. Paralleling my original and present 
essays, both focus on what B-1 Bundle terms “all claims for private 
or ‘non-governmental economic loss and property damages.’”4 
These claims, which exclude oil-platform-worker personal injury 
and death claims, correspond with the inventory of economic–
property losses labeled “covered damages” in section 2702(b) of 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).5  
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 1. See John Costonis, The Macondo Well Blowout: An Admiralty Tort?, 59 
LA. B. J. 28 (2011). 
 2. David W. Robertson, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Issues in OCS Oil 
Spill Cases, 59 LA. B. J. 344 (2012).  
 3. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, 
on April 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. La. 2011) [hereinafter B-1 Bundle]. 
 4. Id. at 947. 
 5. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (2006) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). B-1 Bundle also addresses 
claims for punitive damages, which, although allowed under general maritime 
law, are not included in OPA section 2702(b). 
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Despite the applicability of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act (OCSLA)6 to the Macondo blowout, Professor Robertson 
asserts that “a vessel-related oil spill into the waters over the Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS) is [no] less an admiralty matter than a 
spill into high seas beyond the OCS or into state waters inshore of 
the OCS.”7  
B-1 Bundle comes to the same result by employing the Fifth 
Circuit Model and, largely, the same precedents as Professor 
Robertson.8 The blowout qualifies as an admiralty tort, according 
to B-1 Bundle, because it meets the two standards essential to 
water-borne status decreed in the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Executive Jet Aviation Company v. City of Cleveland9 
and its progeny:10 location and a “substantial relation to a 
                                                                                                             
 6. Ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1331–1356a (2006 & Supp. III 2009)) [hereinafter OCSLA]. 
 7. Robertson, supra note 2, at 345. 
 8. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, unlike Professor Robertson or my 
original essay, also addresses the issue of OPA’s displacement of general 
maritime law. It held that, subject to an exception obligating claimants suing 
OPA responsible parties to satisfy the procedural requirements of OPA section 
2713, OPA and OCSLA do not displace general maritime law. Three 
consequences attend this stunningly aggressive holding, which affords private 
claimants a parallel track alongside OCSLA–OPA to press their property- and 
economic-loss claims. First, claimants may bring general maritime law actions 
seeking the same damages under that law that are defined as “covered damages” 
under OPA section 2702(b). Second, OPA’s silence regarding punitive damages 
does not bar their pursuit under general maritime law. Finally and by implication 
rather than statement, OPA’s express displacement of the Limited Liability Act 
of 1851, now codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006), in OPA section 
2718(a) and (c) does not bar consideration of OPA’s “covered damages” under 
the Act’s procedures so long as the claims are packaged for assertion via the 
parallel track afforded by general maritime law. Subject to the foregoing 
exception, these claims may be asserted against all of the blowout’s potentially 
liable parties (e.g., Cameron, Halliburton, and others), despite OPA section 
2713, which restricts B-1-type claimants to actions against “responsible parties” 
alone. The present Essay identifies a variety of problematic outcomes owing to 
the Fifth Circuit’s self-confessed appetite for the “reflexive invocation of 
admiralty jurisdiction,” which arise in this Essay’s inquiry into Macondo’s 
status as an admiralty tort. Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1087 
(5th Cir. 1990). Admiralty-aggressive outcomes are no less prominent, however, 
in B-1 Bundle’s grant of the parallel track to general maritime law. In view of 
the unwieldiness of addressing both the admiralty jurisdiction and admiralty 
displacement issues in a single study, the author is preparing an independent 
essay addressing the latter.  
 9. 409 U.S. 249 (1972). 
 10. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1989); Sisson 
v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995). B-1 Bundle specifically references the last-
named of this triad. 
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traditional maritime activity” (SRTMA). As a MODU, the 
Deepwater Horizon satisfies the first because it is a “vessel in 
navigable waters.”11 Macondo’s Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 
drilling operations comply with the SRTMA principle,12 it is 
claimed, in line with Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corporation’s holding 
that “oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is 
recognized to be maritime commerce.”13  
Robertson and B-1 Bundle discern no differences at all between 
the Macondo blowout and the Exxon Valdez spill, or between 
Macondo and the personal injury–indemnity contract scenario 
addressed in Theriot. They likewise equate the Deepwater Horizon 
with the Super Scoop dredging barge, which the United States 
Supreme Court deemed a “vessel” in Stewart v. Dutra 
Construction Company.14 
The Exxon Valdez spill occurred in state waters, however, and 
was entirely sourced from a vessel.15 Macondo, in contrast, 
featured two discharges, each of which originated from a situs 
identified in OCSLA.16 Some 4.9 million barrels issued from the 
OCS seabed, denominated by OCSLA as an exclusive federal 
enclave and a component of the nation’s public lands.17 As a 
“temporarily attached device” (TAD),18 the Deepwater Horizon 
MODU likewise qualifies as an OCSLA situs.19  
                                                                                                             
 11. See B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 950 (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, 
Inc., 513 U.S. at 535). 
 12. Id. at 951. 
 13. 783 F.2d 527, 538–39 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 14. 543 U.S. 481 (2005).  
 15. A sobering and decidedly more realistic perspective on the functional 
nonequivalence of non-OCS vessel-related oil spills and OCS well blowouts 
appears in a separate statement from congressional testimony on OPA offered 
by Senators Chaffee, Lieberman, Durenberger, and Graham, who prefigured the 
Macondo tragedy in their warning that:  
[v]essels––even extremely large ones such as the Amoco Cadiz and the 
Exxon Valdez––carry finite supplies of oil, and usually only a portion 
of the cargo is lost because it is compartmentalized . . . . [But] OCS 
[blowouts] . . . can involve prodigious and seemingly unlimited 
quantities of crude oil. The size of such spills can sometimes fill 
hundreds or even thousands of tankers the size of the Exxon Valdez.  
See S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 26–27 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
722, 748–49.  
 16. OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) covers the BP well as a “fixed structure” 
located on the “subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf”; OCSLA 
section 1333(a)(1) addresses the Deepwater Horizon MODU in its reference to 
“temporarily attached” devices employed in the extraction of the OCS seabed’s 
resources. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (2006).   
 17. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 18. The phrase is derived from OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) which states in 
relevant part: 
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Stewart predicated the Super Scoop’s status as a “vessel” on 
general maritime law.20 Neither OPA nor OCSLA played any role 
in Stewart because the Super Scoop was dredging a trench in 
Boston Harbor territorial waters. Stewart’s plaintiff, a worker 
aboard the dredging barge, sought compensation for personal 
injuries incurred during the dredging program.  
The Deepwater Horizon MODU, on the other hand, was 
connected by a drillstring to its OCS seabed source and was 
completing the exploratory phase of BP’s OCS drilling operations 
when the blowout occurred. Macondo’s parties are inland-and-
coastal private claimants seeking recompense for economic and 
property losses incurred 50 miles or more from the MODU in 
many cases. The vessel or nonvessel status of the Deepwater 
Horizon MODU, moreover, is governed by statutes––OCSLA 
section 1333(a)(1) and OPA section 2701––not by general 
maritime law.21  
Professor Robertson22 and B-1 Bundle23 agree that Theriot 
sustains their claim that OCS oil and gas drilling meets Executive 
Jet’s SRTMA criterion. The Theriot action, however, originated 
neither from a spill nor a blowout, but from an oil barge 
employee’s injury that gave rise, in turn, to an indemnity contract 
action between his employer and the oil and gas lessee. Sited on 
Galveston Bay, rather than on OCS waters, and occurring prior to 
OPA’s adoption, the incident was governed neither by OCSLA 
(given its location) nor by OPA (given its date). At issue in Theriot 
was not a tort, as in Macondo, but a “maritime contract” governed 
by general maritime law.24  
                                                                                                             
 
The Constitution and laws . . . of the United States are extended to the 
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial 
islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or 
temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for 
the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources 
therefrom . . . . 
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 19. See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(qualifying a MODU as an OCSLA situs for purposes of OCSLA sections 
1333(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A)), overruled on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, 
Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F. 3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 20. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co. 543 U.S. 481 (2005). Stewart’s immediate 
source for its definition of “vessel” is the codification of the general maritime 
law concept in 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).  
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 117–29.  
 22. Robertson, supra note 2, at 346. 
 23. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 24. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 1986). 
2012] ADMIRALTY LAW AND THE BP WELL BLOWOUT 5 
 
 
 
Ignored by Robertson and B-1 Bundle, moreover, is the most 
telling distinction between the Fifth Circuit’s OCSLA-related tort 
model and the Macondo OCSLA–OPA tort cause of action 
(Macondo Tort): 
The Model is driven by the Circuit’s disposition towards 
securing damages or other compensation for workers atop 
OCS platforms (whether or not “fixed structures”) 
suffering accidental injury or death. The Macondo Tort, in 
contrast, encompasses an off-platform regional population 
of over 100,000 claimants who have suffered economic and 
property loss in consequence of an OCS oil discharge. 
The distinction between the two causes of action has gone 
unnoticed because the BP blowout is the first Fifth Circuit dispute 
of record in which an appreciation of these differences is essential 
to the dispute’s resolution. Fifth Circuit reports feature one 
category of cases evaluating OCSLA platform-worker torts and 
another addressing OPA economic-loss torts. But the reports lack a 
single decision addressing the uniquely configured OCSLA–OPA 
Macondo Tort.25 Only the rarest of OCS blowouts (and, rarer still, 
of OCS vessel spills) are likely to feature the volume of oil 
required to inflict private claimant property and economic losses 
on coastal and inland locations far removed from the pertinent 
OCS drilling operations.26  
Despite Professor Robertson’s indifference to the territorial 
versus over-OCS waters distinction, OCSLA’s role as an essential 
component of the tort cannot be ignored. OCSLA, the Supreme 
Court has declared, “define[s] a body of law applicable to the 
seabed, the subsoil and the . . . structures . . . on the Outer 
                                                                                                             
 25. The author’s review of reported decisions by Fifth Circuit courts 
(district and appellate) discloses only one case discussing both OCSLA and 
OPA as components of its pertinent cause of action. But the case’s key facts—
the presence of an OCS fixed platform rather than MODU, the status of the 
platform’s owner as the OPA claimant rather than as a responsible party 
(defendant), and an allision involving contact of the defendant’s seismic cable 
with a leg of the platform—materially distinguish the case from the B-1 Bundle 
fact pattern. See Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 
1008 (E.D. La. 1993). The OCS rig’s owner, who experienced a well “shut-in” 
in consequence of the discharge of oil from the defendant’s seismic cable, 
sought relief under OPA section 2702(b)(2)(E) for the economic losses 
associated with the shut-in. 
 26. Similar considerations likely account for the absence of reported 
litigation concerning claims under OCSLA title III, which dealt with similar 
economic losses prior to its repeal in 1990. See infra text accompanying notes 
119–26. 
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Continental Shelf.”27 OPA is no less essential to the tort, of course, 
because, as B-1 Bundle itself acknowledges, the statute “governs . . . 
private claims for property damage and economic loss resulting 
from a discharge of oil in navigable waters.”28 The Macondo Tort, 
in short, inextricably engages both statutes in this unique 
configuration. 
A. The Fifth Circuit Model and the Macondo Tort: A Comparison 
The Macondo and the Fifth Circuit Model torts share only their 
common occurrence on OCSLA situses. Macondo’s private 
plaintiffs inhabit entire coastal and inland areas; the Model’s tort 
claimants are workers atop oil drilling rigs. The former seek 
recovery for their economic and property losses; the latter for 
personal injury or death. The former’s “covered damages” under 
OPA section 2702(b) encompass a range of economic and property 
loss injuries extrinsic to the Model’s physical injury–death 
categories, as the latter are processed in admiralty wrongful death, 
negligence, and statutory compensation schemes. 
Macondo defines the status of MODUs through a complex web 
of OCSLA and OPA statutory terms; the Model, by Stewart’s all-
inclusive general maritime law definition. The former pits two 
nonadmiralty federal statutes––OCSLA and OPA—against judge-
made general maritime law, insuring displacement by the former of 
the latter in the event of conflict. The Model’s recurrent 
competitors in OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) contests are federal 
general maritime law and state law, either ex proprio vigore or as 
OCSLA-endorsed surrogate federal law.29 This pairing guarantees 
the former’s victory under the Model, which favors admiralty law 
when it is deemed to apply “of its own force.”30  
                                                                                                             
 27. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969). 
 28. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 953. Public agencies and other 
nonprivate entities may also pursue damage claims under OPA section 2702(b). 
The structural distinctions between the Fifth Circuit Model and the Macondo 
Tort format are detailed at greater length in John Costonis, The Macondo Well 
Blowout: Taking the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Seriously, 42 J. MAR. L. 
& COM. 511, 519–21 (2011) [hereinafter JMARC]. 
 29. OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) provides in relevant part that: 
[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with . . . 
other Federal laws . . . , the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent 
State . . . are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion 
of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial 
islands and fixed structures erected thereon . . . . 
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 30. See, e.g., B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 953; Demette v. Falcon 
Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Grand 
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Finally, the values at stake in Macondo receive expression in 
OCSLA’s 1978 version, which incorporates a “new statutory 
regime”31 to protect the ecological integrity of the OCS and coastal 
areas through interlocking regulatory and liability strategies 
designed to prevent or remediate oil discharge damages. The 
Model, on the other hand, adheres strictly to OCSLA’s original 
1953 version, which focused narrowly on worker welfare atop 
drilling rigs and ignored OCS drilling’s environmental costs, 
thereby enabling polluters to shift these costs to the victims of their 
oil discharges.32 
These differences give rise to five considerations that contest 
Robertson–B-1 Bundle’s classification of the Macondo Tort as an 
admiralty tort. The first is the imperative that the Model’s 
framework creates for labeling the rigs auxiliary to OCS drilling 
operations as “vessels.” 
Critical to supportive worker outcomes is, first, the status of the 
employees (as seamen, as longshoremen or harborworkers, or as 
platform workers not engaged in maritime employment) and, 
second, the status of oil and gas drilling rigs (as “fixed platforms” 
or as “vessels”). The Fifth Circuit has striven to classify MODUs 
as “vessels” in order to extend to platform worker “seamen” the 
benefits of the Jones Act33 and general maritime tort law. The 
Circuit has likewise generously construed the concept of “maritime 
employment” to bring nonseamen platform workers under the 
coverage of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act (LHWCA).34  
                                                                                                             
 
Isle Shipyard Inc., v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009); Smith 
v. Penrod Drilling Co., 960 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 
grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, 589 F.3d 778. The “of its own accord” doctrine 
has been criticized as inconsistent with both the text and legislative history of 
OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A), as well as with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the section in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 
U.S. 352. See Demette, 280 F.3d at 504–10 (DeMoss, J., dissenting); JMARC, 
supra note 28, at 519–20, 535.  
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1461. 
 32. See JMARC, supra note 28 at 530, 533. 
 33. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006). A powerful value driving OCSLA upon its 
adoption in 1953 was the protection of the social welfare of platform workers. 
Because Congress assumed that most of the latter would be from states adjacent 
to platforms, it called for OCSLA-endorsed adjacent state law to apply to 
platform events as surrogate federal law under OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A), 
absent an applicable federal law. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 530, 533–34. 
 34. Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
901–950 (2006)). The term “maritime employment” appears in section 902(3). 
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Offshore Company v. Robison,35 the judicial icon of the Jones 
Act–vessel pairing, illustrates the former observation. Writing over 
a half-century ago, Judge Minor Wisdom observed that “[t]he 
[Jones] Act has always been construed liberally, but recent 
decisions have expanded the coverage of the Jones Act to include 
almost any workman sustaining almost any injury while employed 
on almost any structure that once floated or is capable of floating 
on navigable waters.”36 Buttressed today by the Supreme Court’s 
Stewart decision, the 1959 Robison decision continues as the 
centerpiece of Fifth Circuit decisions generally and in B-1 Bundle 
itself as the basis for equating MODUs with “vessels.”37 
Related efforts to extend the label of “maritime employment” 
for purposes of securing LHWCA compensation for platform 
workers are evident as well. In its Herb’s Welding v. Gray 
decision,38 for example, the Fifth Circuit extended the label to a 
welder aboard a fixed platform engaged in OCS drilling.39  
The second of the five considerations is that the disposition to 
view all oil drilling rigs as “vessels” obscures the opposition to a 
“vessel” label reflected both in OCSLA’s 1978 characterization of 
MODUs as TADs and, less definitively, of OPA’s definition of key 
terms bearing on the Deepwater Horizon’s status.40 Reasoning 
designed to support workers atop drilling platforms is simply not 
covariant with the OCSLA–OPA goal of compensating coastal–
inland oil-discharge private victims.41  
                                                                                                             
 35. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959). That the Robison injury occurred in 
territorial waters and almost two decades prior to OCSLA ’78’s TAD 
amendment has gone unremarked in the half-century since its decision, as 
evidenced by the prominence accorded it, not only by B-1 Bundle and Professor 
Robertson, but also by virtually every other Fifth Circuit opinion on which both 
rely to support their identification of OCS MODUs as “vessels.” Perhaps a 
MODU is a “vessel.” If so, the honors go not to Robison, but to the OCSLA–
OPA statutory definitions (in particular, those of OPA defining a “mobile 
offshore drilling unit” and a “vessel”), and then only after vanquishing 
OCSLA’s treatment of MODUs as TADs. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 36. Robison, 266 F.2d at 771 (emphasis added).  
 37. See B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 38. 703 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 470 U.S. 414 (1985). 
 39. The scope of “maritime employment” endorsed in this Fifth Circuit 
opinion was rejected by the Supreme Court, however, as overly generous in the 
Herb’s Welding appeal. See Herb’s Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 404 (1985); infra 
text accompanying notes 85–90.  
 40. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 41. Illustrative is an observation vented in congressional hearings 
supporting OCSLA’s amendment in 1978 to extend the statute’s coverage to 
TADs while adding a new OCSLA title III pollution prevention and liability 
regime. Drilling activities conducted from exploration platforms, such as the 
Deepwater Horizon MODU, present greater dangers of blowouts and spills than 
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The third is trivializing the hostility to “traditional maritime 
principles” of OCS drilling operations and of the associated 
OCSLA–OPA pollution liability regime. This consequence is 
explored in Part II’s rebuttal of Robertson–B-1 Bundle’s insistence 
that the Macondo blowout is SRTMA-compliant. 
The fourth is the contribution of the “all drilling rigs are 
vessels” mindset to the rebuff that a distressing number of Fifth 
Circuit OCSLA opinions have experienced before the United 
States Supreme Court. The latter’s multiple reversals and 
overrulings seek to restrain, as contrary to Congressional will or 
the Court’s own jurisprudence, the Circuit’s expansive appetite for 
admiralty that usually, but not invariably, links up with its 
determined support for seafaring worker remedies.42 
Finally, B-1 Bundle views the Macondo Tort from the wrong 
end of the telescope by commencing with admiralty law and 
jurisdiction, and, as in B-1 Bundle itself, shaping the initial form 
                                                                                                             
 
activities conducted from the fixed platforms employed for OCS development 
and production operations. In view of congressional testimony affirming these 
greater risks, excluding TADs from OCSLA’s coverage in the Macondo Tort 
setting (by deeming them “vessels”) while including the less risky fixed 
platforms is perverse. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 
1977, Part 2: Hearing Before the Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Outer 
Continental Shelf, 95th Cong. 875–915 (1977) (response of Paul “Red” Adair, 
Red Adair Oil Well Fires and Blowouts Control Co., Houston TX, to committee 
member questions probing the comparative danger of blowouts from 
semisubmersibles versus permanent platform drilling structures). 
 42. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969) 
(reversing two Fifth Circuit decisions below and undermining the Circuit’s 
decision in Snipes v. Pure Oil Co., 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961), which favored 
the applicability of admiralty law to accidents occurring on permanent drilling 
platforms); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) 
(reversing a Circuit ruling that Louisiana’s wrongful death statute applies ex 
proprio vigore in waters above the OCS); Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 421 
(overruling Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981), 
and reversing as “untenable” the Circuit’s holding that “offshore drilling is 
maritime commerce”); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1986) 
(reversing a Circuit ruling as “subvert[ing] the congressional intent documented 
in Rodrigue . . . that admiralty doctrines should not apply under [OCSLA]”); 
Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 686–87 (2012) 
(overruling the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Mills v. Director, 877 F.2d 356 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (en banc), that a “situs of injury” rather than “substantial nexus” 
between an injury and OCS drilling operations test determines LHWCA 
compensation pursuant to OCSLA section 1333(b)); cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 619 (1978) (reversing the Fifth Circuit ruling that 
survivors of deceased worker are entitled to general maritime law loss-of-society 
damages despite their disallowance under the Death on the High Seas Act). 
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and sequence of an entire MDL proceeding on general maritime 
law principles, holding OCSLA and OPA largely in reserve.43  
The Circuit’s management of OCS platform-worker tort claims 
is neither tainted by nor the target of this criticism.44 The welfare 
of workers at sea is a centuries-long commitment, heritage, and 
emblem of admiralty law and its expertise. However problematic 
in the Macondo setting, the Circuit’s pride in the exercise of 
admiralty jurisdiction on behalf of seafarers is evident throughout 
its OCSLA jurisprudence. Rightly, the Circuit takes pride in its 
status as the nation’s preeminent venue for the development of law 
at the intersection of admiralty and oil and gas operations.45 It 
holds sway over an area of the lower 48 states in which the lion’s 
share of United States’ offshore drilling is conducted.46  
But the Macondo Tort totters on admiralty’s far periphery, if 
indeed it respects this boundary at all. OCS drilling operations and 
their governance are post-1950 developments that feature 
environmental, public safety, and liability allocation issues of 
                                                                                                             
 43. See supra note 8. Appreciating the likely contentiousness of the 
statement in text, the author has reserved its discussion and defense to an entire 
essay in progress. 
 44. Other than the objection in text to uncritically transferring reasoning 
appropriate to the Fifth Circuit Model to the Macondo OCSLA–OPA tort, the 
author’s uneasiness with Fifth Circuit jurisprudence is limited essentially to the 
Circuit’s application of admiralty law as applying “of its own force” in the 
absence of evidence in relevant circumstances of congressional intent that 
admiralty law should override OCSLA. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 534–40; 
infra text accompanying note 107.  
 45. The Fifth Circuit’s preeminence appears in a comparison of the number 
of opinions on the issues immediately relevant to this Essay decided by the 
Federal Fifth Circuit and its district-level trial courts with those of the nation’s 
other eleven federal circuits and their associated trial courts, using as the 
comparison’s database all non-United States Supreme Court federal cases cited 
in THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW (5th ed. 2011). 
The sampling derives from opinions cited by Professor Schoenbaum in Chapter 
3, section 3-6 (Admiralty Jurisdiction: What is a Vessel?) and section 3-9 
(Admiralty Jurisdiction: Continental Shelf Operations), and in Chapter 7, 
section 7-3 (Longshore and Harbor Worker: Offshore Workers). Among other 
topics, these sections exhaustively address vessel versus nonvessel distinctions; 
OCSLA jurisdiction with respect to OCS operations and activities; and the 
LHWCA–OCS interface as it relates to the coverage of OCS platform workers 
under the LHWCA. The combined total of cases cited, respectively, under these 
headings is as follows:  
Opinions from the Federal Fifth Circuit and its District courts: 127 
Opinions from the 11 other Federal Circuits and their District Courts: 13.  
 46. QUEST OFFSHORE RES. INC., THE STATE OF THE OFFSHORE U.S. OIL AND 
GAS INDUSTRY iii n.1 (2011), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/ 
Files/Policy/Exploration/Quest_2011_December_29_Final.ashx. 
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profound scientific, economic, legal, and policy complexity.47 
Congress and federal agencies have been addressing these issues 
through myriad statutes, including OCSLA and OPA, that are 
grounded in the Property and Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
clauses, not in the Admiralty Clause.48  
Macondo most surely is the worst environmental–oil pollution 
discharge disaster in the nation’s history. Judge-made general 
maritime law has proven itself no match for assessing or 
addressing an event of this character and magnitude. Furthermore, 
it has long espoused procedural and substantive values––shaped in 
large part by shipping and insurance interests––that have been 
either indifferent or flatly antithetical to those championed by the 
current OCSLA–OPA pollution prevention and liability regime.49 
Were general maritime law up to the task, of course, there would 
have been no need for the federal government’s lengthy, recurring 
efforts to detail the contours of a private cause of action, such as 
that originally defined in OCSLA’s former title III, and since 
carried over into OPA.50 
A summary of federal legislative efforts begins with 
Congress’s adoption in 1953 of OCSLA in its original form. 
OCSLA, the Supreme Court declared in 1969 in Rodrigue v. Aetna 
                                                                                                             
 47. For a comprehensive inventory and review of these issues, see NAT’L 
COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING (REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT) pts. II & III (2011) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENT’S REPORT].   
 48. See infra notes 125–26. 
 49. The transition from judge-made general maritime law’s primitive efforts 
to formulate both a rationale and a remedial system for the action I have 
described as the Macondo Tort, as well as the hostility of the resulting law’s 
procedural and substantive principles to the values incorporated in the OCSLA–
OPA private cause of action are detailed in, e.g., PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra 
note 47, at chs. 7–10; Lawrence Kiern, Liability, Compensation, Financial 
Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First 
Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481, 507–89 (2000). Reflective of the clash is 
Congress’s rejection in OPA of the “Robins Doctrine” as a bar to economic loss 
claims, see 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2006); of the application of the Limited 
Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006), to the calculation of 
OPA response costs and damages, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718(a), (c); of the 
procedure pursuant to which all private claims for OPA’s “covered damages” 
against “responsible parties” must mandatorily be pursued, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 
2702(b)(2), 2713(a)–(d); and, more comprehensively, of OPA’s nonobstante 
clause barring admiralty law insofar as OPA provisions so dictate, see 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2751(e). If any of the three arguments offered in this Essay countering the 
admiralty claim for the Macondo Tort is correct, it merits emphasis, section 
2751(e) does not “save” admiralty law or jurisdiction because the tort falls 
outside of the former’s potential “savings” coverage.   
 50. See infra text accompanying notes 51–60. 
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Casualty & Surety Company, was intended to “define a body of 
law applicable to the seabed, the subsoil and the . . . structures . . . 
on the Outer Continental Shelf.”51 OCSLA ’53’s legislative 
history, as carefully evaluated by Rodrigue, disdains admiralty law 
as OCS governing law.52 Responding to coastal states’ post-Santa 
Barbara distress over the many intervening oil spills, Congress 
refashioned OCSLA in 1978 as a “new statutory regime” designed 
to “prevent or minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well 
control, fires . . . or other occurrences which may cause damage to 
the environment or to property, or endanger life or health.”53 
Congress could not have spoken more directly to Macondo’s core 
issue and corresponding remedial program, particularly as the 
latter was subsequently refined and expanded by OPA.  
In service to these goals, Congress amended OCSLA section 
1333(a)(1) in 1978 to add TADs as OCSLA situses alongside the 
1953 version’s “fixed structures.”54 A new title III defined the 
refashioned statute’s allocation of liability for blowouts, fires, and 
spills.55 Congress converted MODUs from “vessels” into “offshore 
facilities”56 to support OCSLA’s new statutory remedies for off-
platform private economic and property losses. OCSLA ’78 set 
forth a self-contained, nonadmiralty regime buttressed by the 
“polluter pays” principle to compensate private claimants for these 
losses.57 
Following the Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989, Congress 
unanimously adopted OPA, which the Senate Public Works and 
Environmental Committee portrayed as a “single Federal law 
providing cleanup authority, penalties, and liability from oil 
pollution.”58 Consolidated and harmonized within this single act 
were major elements of four existing oil pollution statutes, 
including OCSLA’s title III.59 Congress substituted OPA title I for 
                                                                                                             
 51. 395 U.S. 352, 356 (1969). 
 52. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 530–37. 
 53. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(6) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 54. Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 203(a) (1978). 
 55. Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 301–315 (1978). 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 119–26. 
 57. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 540–51. 
 58. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 
730. OPA, the Committee added, was designed to replace a “fragmented 
collection of Federal and State laws providing inadequate cleanup and damage 
remedies, taxpayer subsidies to cover cleanup costs, third party damages that go 
uncompensated, and substantial barriers to victim recoveries . . . .” Id. at 2.  
 59. The three other statutes are the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-627, 88 Stat. 2176 (1978) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501–24 
(2006)); the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 
Stat. 576 (1973) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1656 (2006)); and 
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OCSLA’s title III, leaving untouched the 1978 TAD amendment. 
OPA, B-1 Bundle itself confirms, “governs . . . private claims for 
property damage and economic loss resulting from a discharge of 
oil in navigable waters.”60 
B. Summary of the Argument  
This Essay advances three fundamental claims. First, the 
Macondo blowout does not satisfy Executive Jet’s SRTMA criterion 
(Part II). Second, B-1 Bundle’s insistence that admiralty law applies 
“of its own force” to the Macondo blowout fails because it repeats 
the error of the Fifth Circuit’s 1961 opinion in Snipes v. Pure Oil 
Company.61 The Supreme Court undermined Snipes in Rodrigue by 
holding that torts occurring on OCSLA situses are governed by 
OCSLA, rather than admiralty law, unless Congress expresses a 
contrary intent (Part III). Third, the Deepwater Horizon MODU is a 
hybrid capable of assuming identity under OPA as either a 
“vessel”62 or as an “offshore facility”63–“Outer Continental Shelf 
facility.”64 With respect to the Macondo Tort, the MODU was 
functioning as the latter rather than as a vessel when the OCS 
blowout occurred (Part IV).  
Part II’s discussion of the SRTMA issue finds Robertson–B-1 
Bundle’s insistence that Macondo OCS oil and gas drilling is 
SRTMA-compliant bluntly repudiated in the Supreme Court’s 
contrary characterization of OCS drilling operations. This review 
carefully disassociates the Court’s portrayal of these operations 
from OCSLA’s section 1333(a)(2)(A) choice-of-law issues, for 
                                                                                                             
 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified 
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). Foreshadowing a 
cardinal conclusion of the author’s pending portrayal of OCSLA–OPA’s substantial 
displacement of general maritime law, the comprehensiveness of the two 
nonadmiralty statutes’ delineation of the Macondo Tort action appears on two 
fronts. The first is Congress’s reformulation of general maritime law’s episodic, 
conflicting, and, at best, embryonic treatment of the tort. The second is 
Congress’s own undertaking in OPA to comprehensively incorporate and 
reformulate in a single federal statute its own work in the four prior statutes 
identified in text and in this footnote. This extraordinarily extensive undertaking 
leaves negligible space for the credibility of any claim that these efforts fall 
short of Congress’s effective occupation of a field coextensive with the 
boundaries delineated in the Macondo Tort action. 
 60. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 953 (E.D. La. 2011).  
 61. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).  
 62. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37) (2006). 
 63. Id. § 2701(22). 
 64. Id. § 2701(25). 
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which the distinction between “fixed structures” and MODUs as 
TADs has proven decisive in resolving the choice of law question.  
Part III disagrees with B-1 Bundle’s application to the 
Macondo Tort the three-step test set forth in Union Texas 
Petroleum Corporation v. PLT Engineering Corporation (PLT).65 
The PLT test’s goal is to determine whether OCSLA-endorsed 
state law or admiralty law prevails in OCSLA’s section 
1333(a)(2)(A) choice-of-law contests. Contrary to Professor 
Robertson’s insistence on barring MODUs from these contests,66 
the Fifth Circuit has held that TADs qualify for the test.67 B-1 
Bundle dutifully adheres to the Circuit’s position.68  
Part III’s argument proceeds in two steps. First, MODUs 
became proper candidates for the section 1333(a)(2)(A) contest no 
later than the 1978 addition of TADs to OCSLA section 
1333(a)(1).69 Second, because Macondo is a tort originating from 
two qualified OCSLA situses, Rodrigue precludes the application 
of admiralty law to them. Rodrigue teaches that admiralty law will 
not displace OCSLA with respect to such torts absent Congress’s 
expression of its intent favoring displacement.70  
Part III recognizes the Fifth Circuit’s position, as reflected in 
Theriot, that judges can more easily favor displacement by 
admiralty law in contract-based causes of action, even for events 
occurring on OCSLA situses. The Circuit’s “focus-of-the-contract” 
standard affords greater latitude for this outcome than does the 
OCSLA tort’s rigid physical location standard.71 Part III views 
                                                                                                             
 65. 895 F.2d 1043, 1047–48 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 66. See David W. Robertson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act’s 
Provisions on Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Choice of Law: Correcting the Fifth 
Circuit’s Mistakes, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 487, 534–35, 541–42 (2007).  
 67. See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 498 n.18 (5th Cir. 
2002), overruled on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor 
Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009); PLT, 895 F.2d at 1047–48. 
 68. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 953 (E.D. La. 2011).  
 69. Speaking to OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s amendment in 1987, the 
Conference Committee characterized the initiative as “technical and perfecting 
and [as] meant to restate and clarify and not change existing law.” H.R. CONF. 
REP. NO. 95-1474, at 80 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1679. 
This language may plausibly be understood as indicating that the term “fixed 
structures” as used in the 1953 version of OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) should 
not be read as excluding the eventual inclusion of MODUs within it. MODUs 
did not come into use until the late 1950s. See PRESIDENT’S REPORT, supra note 
47, at 22–25. If the intent of the phrase “fixed structures,” as used in 1953, were 
to include only rigs extant at that time, the Conference Committee’s 1978 
statement becomes gibberish.  
 70. See infra text accompanying note 107.   
 71. See Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 781 
(5th Cir. 2009) (en banc); JMARC, supra note 28, at 518 n.40.  
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Theriot as inapt, however, not only because it is a non-OCSLA, 
territorial waters case, but also because it sounds in contract under 
facts that persuaded the court that the indemnity contract in 
question was “maritime.”  
Part IV disputes that general maritime law alone resolves the 
status of the Deepwater Horizon MODU as a “vessel.” Citing the 
distinctions dividing the Model from the Macondo Tort, it finds the 
Robison line of authority classifying MODUs as vessels unsuitable 
for the latter, however appropriate it may be for the Model. 
Agreeing with Fifth Circuit Judge Henry Politz’s endorsement of 
Judge Brown’s counsel that “the term ‘vessel’ for Jones Act 
purposes . . . is [not] necessarily a vessel for other purposes as 
well,”72 Part IV advances the concept of MODUs as hybrids, the 
proper classification of which depends upon the purpose for and 
setting within which the classification is sought. Part IV also 
observes that Judge Barbier’s B-1 Bundle rejection of TADs as a 
hybrid concept seems out of step with his apparent willingness to 
endorse the hybrid analogy in a subsequent MDL opinion.73 
II. THE MACONDO BLOWOUT: “SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO A 
TRADITIONAL MARITIME ACTIVITY”? 
A. OCSLA’s Legislative History, Rodrigue, Herb’s Welding, and 
Grubart 
OCSLA’s legislative history, as further amplified by the United 
States Supreme Court, is unkind to the Robertson74–B-1 Bundle75 
view that the Macondo blowout is “substantially related to a 
traditional maritime activity.” Failure to satisfy this requirement, of 
course, dooms the blowout’s status as an admiralty tort, whether or 
not the Deepwater Horizon is a “vessel.”  
Robertson and B-1 Bundle invoke Theriot and the Supreme 
Court’s Foremost Insurance Company v. Richardson76 decisions. 
But these choices are not up to the task assigned to them. Indeed, 
                                                                                                             
 72. Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. Am. Int’l Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049, 
1053 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. 
v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132, 1136–37 (5th Cir. May 
1981)), cert. denied, AMF Tuboscope v. Houston Oil & Minerals Corp., 484 
U.S. 1067 (1988). 
 73. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (E.D. La. 2012); infra text 
accompanying notes 130–31.  
 74. Robertson, supra note 2, at 346. 
 75. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 76. 457 U.S. 668 (1982). 
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Foremost’s facts––the collision of two pleasure boats on a 
Louisiana river—afford a strikingly awkward choice for an inquiry 
as fact-sensitive in relation to Macondo’s OCS drilling-operations 
context as the SRTMA principle demands. 
The factually appropriate precedents, which Robertson and B-1 
Bundle exclude in their SRTMA analyses,77 appear in the Supreme 
Court’s portrayal in Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding of Congress’s 
and its own conception of OCS oil and gas operations. Likewise 
pertinent, but overlooked even though closer to home, are 
decisions within the Fifth Circuit itself that also find particular 
OCS drilling operations non-SRTMA compliant.78 
At issue in Rodrigue was the familiar choice between OCSLA-
endorsed law and admiralty law to govern accidental deaths 
occurring atop fixed platforms. The Court chose the former because 
admiralty’s Death on the High Seas Act,79 which covers events on 
the “high seas,” failed to override OCSLA’s more specific targeting 
of these platforms for the OCSLA alternative.80 Herb’s Welding 
ruled that because OCS operations are not “maritime commerce,” a 
welder injured atop one of these platforms could not recover under 
the LHWCA because he was not an employee engaged in “maritime 
employment” under section 902(3).81  
These cases are not featured for these holdings as such, but for 
their mapping of a relationship between OCS drilling operations 
and admiralty law, espoused by Congress and the Supreme Court 
alike, that cannot be squared with the conclusion that OCS drilling 
is SRTMA-compliant.  
Rodrigue’s account of their dissonance is unyielding. 
Reversing two Fifth Circuit decisions favoring admiralty law over 
                                                                                                             
 77. Both sources bring the cases cited in text into play in the OCSLA 
section 1333(a)(2) choice-of-law context, in which the distinction among 
different types of OCS platforms may prove outcome determinative. But the 
character of a drilling rig does not drive the SRTMA outcome; the activity of 
engaging in OCS drilling operations does. See infra text accompanying notes 
87–96. While relevant to the Fifth Circuit Model addressing tortious injury or 
death of on-platform workers, moreover, the distinction is less convincing when 
applied to the quite different population of coastal and inland plaintiffs who 
suffer economic and property loss in consequence of an OCSLA situs-based oil 
discharge. See supra text accompanying notes 26–48. 
 78. See, e.g., Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered 
Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 760, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2006), amended on reh’g, 453 F.3d 
652 (5th Cir. 2006); Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. Am. Int’l Tool Co., 827 
F.2d 1049, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, AMF Tuboscope v. Houston 
Oil & Minerals Corp., 484 U.S. 1067 (1988). 
 79. 46 U.S.C. § 30301–30308 (2006). 
 80. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 359 (1969). 
 81. Herb’s Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 421–24 (1985). 
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OCSLA, the Court stated that the Senate committee deliberating 
OCSLA ’53 “was acutely aware of the inaptness of admiralty law. 
The bill applied the same law as to the seabed and subsoil, as well 
as to the artificial islands, and admiralty law was obviously 
unsuited to that task.”82  
Reinforcing this dour assessment is the Court’s response to an 
admiralty expert’s testimony at an OCSLA ’53 hearing that 
“[m]aritime law in the strict sense has never had to deal with the 
resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill 
adapted for that purpose.”83 The Court declared that “[s]ince 
[OCSLA] treats seabed, subsoil, and artificial islands the same, 
dropping any reference to special treatment for presumptive 
vessels, the most sensible interpretation of Congress’s reaction to 
this testimony is that admiralty treatment was eschewed 
altogether. . . .”84 
The SRTMA claim fares no better in Herb’s Welding. The 
Court excoriated as “untenable” the Circuit’s view that “offshore 
drilling is maritime commerce.”85 Herb’s Welding’s explicit 
confirmation of and reference to the Court’s assessment in 
Rodrigue that OCSLA’s legislative history “at the very least 
forecloses the Court of Appeals’ holding that offshore drilling is a 
maritime activity . . . ”86 would seem to leave precious little space 
for the Robertson–B-1 Bundle position.  
Professor Robertson seeks to save his argument by 
distinguishing Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding from Macondo on the 
ground that the former featured fixed drilling platforms, not 
Transocean’s temporarily attached MODU.87 In line with 
Theriot,88 he invokes a Herb’s Welding footnote stating that:  
 
                                                                                                             
 82. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 364–65 (emphasis added).  
 83. Outer Continental Shelf: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong. 668 (1953) (statement of Richard 
Young, Esq.) (emphasis added).  
 84. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 365, n.12 (emphasis added). 
 85. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). Professor Robertson 
criticizes my reliance on Herb’s Welding because the platforms in question were 
fixed. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 346. Their status as either fixed or 
temporarily attached, however, is not dispositive of the issue addressed in text. 
See infra text accompanying notes 89–96.  
 86. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). 
 87. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 346. B-1 Bundle concedes that the 
argument “has appeal,” B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951, 952 (E.D. La. 
2011), but yields to contrary Fifth Circuit precedent, particularly as set forth in 
PLT, see Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng’g Corp., 895 F.2d 1043, 
1047–48 (5th Cir. 1990).  
 88. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 539 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986).  
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[o]ffshore oil rigs are of two general sorts: fixed and 
floating. Floating structures have been treated as vessels by 
the lower courts. Workers on them, unlike workers on fixed 
platforms, enjoy the same remedies as workers on ships. If 
permanently attached to the vessel as crewmembers, they 
are regarded as seamen; if not, they are covered by the 
LHWCA because they are employed on navigable waters.89 
The fixed versus floating structure distinction, Part I confirms, 
has indeed proven influential in scores of personal injury–death 
tort actions brought by or on behalf of on-platform workers. But 
Part I likewise confirms the error of claiming that the same 
distinction should govern the outcome of a SRTMA inquiry 
addressing Macondo economic and property loss claimants. The 
Theriot and Grubart discussions immediately below establish, 
moreover, that the vessel–location admiralty tort requirement, 
which does engage OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A), is separate and 
distinct from the SRTMA compliance requirement. Each must be 
satisfied independently of the other to ground admiralty 
jurisdiction under the Executive Jet line of cases.90  
B. Theriot and Pippen  
Theriot merits meticulous scrutiny, not only because Professor 
Robertson extols it,91 but also because it is the sole basis upon 
which B-1 Bundle ruled that Macondo’s OCS exploratory well 
drilling operations are SRTMA-compliant.92 “Oil and gas drilling 
on navigable waters aboard a vessel is recognized to be maritime 
commerce,” Theriot baldly asserts,93 leaving the task of defending 
its diktat to Pippen v. Shell Oil Company.94  
But neither Theriot nor Pippen can bear the weight assigned to 
it. As previously noted, the contrary view of ocean-based drilling 
operations embraced in Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding cannot be 
                                                                                                             
 89. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 416 n.2 (citations omitted).  
 90. The OCSLA inquiry does not drive the SRTMA inquiry’s outcome, but 
there will be instances when the latter will drive the former. PLT Step 2 of the 
OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) choice-of-law analysis accords priority to 
admiralty law over OCSLA-endorsed law when, inter alia, the admiralty law 
applies “of its own force.” In disputes featuring non-SRTMA compliant 
activities, admiralty law cannot be said to apply of its own force because the 
underlying activities fail to trigger admiralty jurisdiction and law in the first 
instance. See cases cited supra note 78; JMARC, supra note 28, at 557–60. 
 91. Robertson, supra note 2, at 346. 
 92. 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 93. Theriot, 783 F.2d at 538–39. 
 94. 661 F.2d 378, 384 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981).  
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dismissed on the basis asserted in Theriot and by Professor 
Robertson that scenarios featuring semisubmersibles are ipso facto 
SRTMA-compliant.  
Hostile to this claim for essentially the same reason is Jerome 
B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company.95 The 
Court’s analysis of Executive Jet’s duo of location–vessel and 
SRTMA elements rules out meshing the two (as in the expression 
“drilling for oil from a vessel”). Hence, the instrumentality of OCS 
drilling (a “vessel on navigable waters”) must be examined 
independently from the activity it enables (“oil and gas drilling”) 
and vice-versa. “Because the injuries suffered by Grubart and the 
other flood victims were caused by a vessel on navigable waters,” 
the Supreme Court carefully spells out, “the location inquiry would 
seem to be at an end.”96 Only after bookending this inquiry does 
the Court turn to Grubart’s SRTMA issue. 
No less problematic is Theriot’s or, derivatively, B-1 Bundle’s 
reliance on Pippen to justify offshore drilling’s SRTMA 
compliance. Not only does Pippen fail to provide any support for 
its ukase that “offshore drilling [sic] the discovery, recovery, and 
sale of oil and natural gas from the sea bottom is maritime 
commerce,”97 but Pippen’s identification of oil-drilling operations 
with “maritime commerce” was expressly rebuffed in the Supreme 
Court’s Herb’s Welding opinion.98  
At issue in Pippen was whether Mr. Pippen’s injury while 
performing wireline services on a drilling barge was incurred in 
“maritime employment,” which would entitle him to compensation 
under the LHWCA as a section 902(3) “employee.” The “offshore 
drilling . . . is maritime commerce” statement appears as the 
unsupported minor premise of a syllogism designed to prove that 
Pippen’s duties have a “realistically significant relationship to 
traditional maritime activity.”99 The syllogism’s major premise, 
according to the court, is that a “significant relationship” exists 
“when the purpose of the employee’s activities is to facilitate 
maritime commerce.”100 With the insertion of the unsupported 
vessel-based drilling is maritime commerce minor premise, the 
                                                                                                             
 95. 513 U.S. 527 (1995). 
 96. Id. at 535. 
 97. Pippen, 661 F.2d at 384. 
 98. Herb’s Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 419 (1985). Herb’s Welding 
explains that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion below was expressly predicated on 
Pippen’s earlier holding that activities integral to OCS drilling operations are 
“maritime commerce.” Id. 
 99. Pippen, 661 F.2d at 384 n.10. 
 100. Id. at 383–84. 
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conclusion links Pippen’s activity to the “realistically significant 
relationship to maritime commerce.”  
Even absent the contrary portrayal of offshore drilling in 
Rodrigue, Herb’s Welding, and conforming Fifth Circuit opinions, 
Pippen’s premise that the mere statement of a position secures its 
validation equates to little more than a tautology, a “reflexive” 
rather than a reasoned response.  
III. THE DEEPWATER HORIZON: AN OCSLA SITUS TO WHICH 
ADMIRALTY LAW DOES NOT APPLY?  
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence endorses the view that TADs merit 
status as OCSLA situses under the first step of the PLT analysis 
superintended under OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A).101 PLT 
presents the latter as requiring a three-step inquiry that selects 
admiralty law absent satisfaction of any of three elements: (1) the 
event must occur on an OCSLA situs; (2) admiralty law must not 
apply to the event “of its own force”; and (3) the nonadmiralty 
alternative (OCSLA-endorsed state law) must be consistent with 
“other federal law,” as required by OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A).  
Applied to the Macondo Tort, Step 1 favors OCSLA in light of 
the Circuit’s agreement that OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) situses 
merit inclusion in the PLT calculus.  
Step 2, Robertson and B-1 Bundle insist, defeats OCSLA 
because they deem admiralty law to apply “of its own force.” This 
is so, they claim, because the Macondo Tort satisfies both poles of 
Executive Jet: OCS drilling is SRTMA-compliant, and the MODU 
is a “vessel in navigable waters.”  
Part II’s examination of Theriot–Pippen and Rodrigue–Herb’s 
Welding exposes the implausibility of the first claim.  
The general maritime law-based “vessel” claim is unpersuasive 
on two separate grounds. The first, addressed in Part IV, is that 
Robertson and B-1 Bundle err in seeking to resolve the Deepwater 
Horizon’s status under nonstatutory general maritime law. The 
proper focus for their gaze is instead OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s 
language and legislative history, OPA’s subsequent adoption, and, 
in this Macondo setting, OCSLA–OPA’s targeting of off-platform, 
                                                                                                             
 101. See cases cited supra note 67. Consistent with this acknowledgement, 
B-1 Bundle likewise treats the Deepwater Horizon, an OCSLA section 
1333(a)(1) MODU, as an OCSLA situs under the PLT Step 1 analysis. It then 
appeals to Theriot under PLT Step 2 to conclude, inter alia, that because OCS 
drilling is SRTMA-qualified, admiralty law applies of its own accord, thereby 
barring selection of the OCSLA-endorsed state law. See B-1 Bundle, 808 F. 
Supp. 2d 943, 950–52 (E.D. La. 2011). 
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economic-loss claimants rather than of injured or deceased seamen 
or platform workers.  
The second rationale is set forth directly in Rodrigue itself. 
Rodrigue clashed with the Fifth Circuit’s Snipes v. Pure Oil 
Company decision,102 which, in another manifestation of the 
Circuit’s reflexive admiralty-centrism, defined as “maritime” a 
tortious injury suffered by an OCS stationary platform worker at 
this OCSLA site. Rodrigue countered that admiralty law does not 
apply to torts originating on OCSLA situses unless Congress 
affirmatively expresses its “intent” favoring this override.  
MODUs qualify as OCSLA situses under Rodrigue, now 
updated to take account of OCSLA ’78’s addition of “temporarily 
attached devices” alongside OCSLA ’53’s “fixed structures.”103 
The Death on the High Seas Act104 failed as an expression of this 
intent, the Court ruled in Rodrigue, because the Act covered events 
occurring on the “high seas,” not those originating on an OCSLA 
situs.105 Rodrigue’s accidents occurred on the fixed platforms in 
question, which Congress analogized to “artificial islands” that 
would not have been subject to “traditional maritime principles” 
pre-OCSLA in any event.106  
But the Court stated that it would have made no difference 
even if the platforms had been subject to these principles. The 
                                                                                                             
 102. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 103. Although not advanced by Robertson–B-1 Bundle, the objection can be 
anticipated that while the Macondo oil originated from OSLA situses, it satisfied 
Executive Jet’s location requirement when it made its way into the high seas and 
territorial waters. But Congress enacted OCSLA under the Property Clause and 
the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clause, not under the Admiralty Clause. 
See infra notes 125–26. Congress’s Property Clause powers were deemed 
essentially limitless in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976), and 
were endorsed as extending to the “regulation of conduct on or off the public 
land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal lands.” Minnesota v. 
Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1982). Congress’s OCSLA goals include 
the generation of federal revenue and the protection of the United States’ 
economic and security interests by insuring unhampered federal control of OCS 
oil reserves. See JMARC, supra note 28, at 526–34. But these goals were 
frustrated in the 1970s by post-Santa Barbara Channel spill drilling moratoria 
sought by coastal states fearful of similar environmental, pollution, and 
economic threats to their coasts and residents. Id. at 540–44. OCSLA ’78 and, 
subsequently, OPA, were adopted, as per Block, to “regulate conduct . . . off the 
public land [viz. the high seas and state waters] that would threaten the 
designated purpose of federal lands [viz. the OCS].” Block, 660 F.2d at 1249. 
Hence, the position expressed in notes 125 and 126 that as a nonadmiralty 
initiative, the Macondo OCSLA–OPA tort regime neither incorporates nor 
derives from admiralty law or jurisdiction.  
 104. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308 (2006).  
 105. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 366 (1969). 
 106. Id. at 360–61.  
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Court’s language favoring this conclusion could not be more 
forthright:  
Even if the admiralty law would have applied to the deaths 
occurring in these cases under traditional principles, 
[OCSLA’s] legislative history shows that Congress did not 
intend that result. First, Congress assumed that the 
admiralty law would not apply [to an OCSLA situs] unless 
Congress made it apply, and then Congress decided not to 
make it apply.107 
Likewise unavailing is any claim under PLT Step 3 that the 
nonadmiralty alternative is defeated by “inconsistent” federal law, 
taking the form in this instance of judge-made general maritime 
law. The argument is an ill-conceived attempt to reject admiralty 
law’s prior repudiation under Step 2. It ignores, moreover, that 
OCSLA itself is “other federal law” which, by deeming MODUs 
OCSLA situses, speaks directly to the matter inconsistently 
resolved by the former. Along with OPA, Professor Robertson 
agrees that OCSLA “necessarily displace[s] anything in maritime 
common law deemed inconsistent with the statute’s provisions.”108 
A comparison of this conception of the PLT test’s application to 
Macondo with the majority and dissenting opinions’ treatment of the 
issue in Demette affords an instructive bridge to Part IV’s discussion 
of the Deepwater Horizon’s status under OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) 
and OPA section 2701. Like Theriot, Demette posed the question of 
a MODU’s status in conjunction with an indemnity contract dispute 
arising out of a platform worker’s injury.109 In Demette, however, 
the platform, owned by the company suing the worker’s employer 
for defense and indemnity, was located on the OCS, not in territorial 
waters. The court looked to the PLT test to address the employer’s 
claim that OCSLA-endorsed Louisiana law governed the indemnity 
contact’s validity.110  
The court viewed itself as facing three choices in determining 
the status of the MODU under PLT Step 1 and, derivatively, under 
                                                                                                             
 107. Id. at 361. Equally explicit is the Court’s reassertion of its Rodrigue 
holding in Herb’s Welding: OCSLA’s legislative history, the Court declared, 
establishes that “Congress was of the view that maritime law would not apply to 
fixed platforms unless a statute expressly so provided . . . .” Herb’s Welding v. 
Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 422 (1985) (emphasis added).  
 108. Robertson, supra note 2, at 345.  
 109. The MODU is this instance was a jack-up vessel, which Demette 
categorized as a “special-purpose movable drilling rig[].” Demette v. Falcon 
Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 498 n.18 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds 
by Grand Isle Shipyard Inc., v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 110. Id. at 500–01. 
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Step 2. The first was that of the injured worker’s employer: the 
MODU is a “vessel” and, as such, fails as an OCSLA section 
1333(a)(1) situs that qualifies for review under section 
1333(a)(2)(A).111 The latter section refers only to “artificial islands 
and fixed structures,” omitting any reference to section 
1333(a)(1)’s “temporarily attached devices.” The second choice is 
that approved by the Demette majority: the MODU is a “vessel,” 
but it is also an OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) situs that merits review 
under section 1333(a)(2)(A) despite the foregoing omission.112 The 
third choice is that of Judge DeMoss in dissent: the MODU is not a 
general maritime law “vessel” because the legislative history of 
OCSLA’s 1978 amendment establishes that TADs and “vessels” 
are mutually exclusive.113 Absent a “vessel,” the platform injury 
loses its foundation in admiralty, rendering the section 
1333(a)(2)(A) choice of law contest superfluous.114 
The Demette majority merits qualified praise for going 
somewhat beyond a simplistic assertion of the general maritime 
law definition of vessel in its inquiry. But it continued to honor 
pre-OCSLA ’78, territorial-waters Robison as establishing “beyond 
doubt”115 that MODUs retain their identify as vessels even as it 
concluded that MODUs also double up as section 1333(a)(1) 
OCSLA situses.116  
IV. THE DEEPWATER HORIZON MODU: VESSEL, OFFSHORE 
FACILITY–OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OFFSHORE FACILITY, 
HERMAPHRODITE, OR HYBRID? 
Were affairs in 2010 as they were in 1978, Judge DeMoss’s 
view that MODUs and “vessels” are mutually exclusive would be 
difficult to challenge. The legislative history of two principal 
                                                                                                             
 111. Id. at 498. 
 112. Id. at 498–500, 504. 
 113. Id. at 506–11 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 508 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). Judge DeMoss’s position is 
considerably more hostile to Fifth Circuit Model reasoning than appears in text. 
He also insisted that PLT Step 2, which probes whether admiralty law applies of 
its own accord, is misconceived because OCSLA rules out admiralty law as a 
permissible alternative altogether. Id. at 505 n.2 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).  
 115. Id. at 498, n.18. 
 116. A skeptic may be pardoned for questioning the latter characterization’s 
significance, however, given Demette’s contract setting. The plasticity of 
standards for declaring a contact “maritime” opens an easy route to ruling under 
PLT Step 2 that admiralty law applies of its own accord even for events 
occurring on OCS platforms, an option the court in fact exercised. This option is 
not available in the Macondo setting because, again, B-1 Bundle claims sound in 
tort, not contract. 
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OCSLA amendments––those adding TADs to OCSLA section 
1333(a)(1) and a new title III—establish that the “new statutory 
regime” envisioned by Congress demands no less.  
But the clarity of this picture diminished in 1990 with 
Congress’s adoption of OPA in 1990. Congress left untouched 
MODUs’ status as TADs, a reality that Judge DeMoss, alone 
among his Fifth Circuit colleagues, has taken seriously. But 
Congress also repealed title III and included an OPA 2701(37) 
definition for “vessels” duplicating the Stewart model. On the 
other hand, it declared that MODUs are “vessel[s] capable of use 
as . . . offshore facilit[ies]” and then defined “offshore facilit[ies]” 
expressly to exclude “vessels.”117 It further reinforced MODUs’ 
status as offshore facilities by bringing them within its definition of 
an “Outer Continental Shelf facility,”118 as an offshore facility 
employed, like the Deepwater Horizon, in OCS resource 
operations.  
Hence, the question: Should the “vessel” label be attached 
under OPA to the Deepwater Horizon MODU, which is a 
confirmed OCSLA situs as well as a TAD, when it is also 
functioning as an OPA twin-offshore–Outer Continental Shelf 
facility? Stated alternatively, Should MODUs be regarded as 
hermaphrodites, that is, “vessels,” even when functioning in a 
nonvessel mode, or as hybrids, shifting between the status solely of 
“vessels” or solely of “offshore facilities” depending upon the 
context in which the issue is raised and the use assigned to the 
MODU when the tort occurs? Pertinent to the latter dimension, of 
course, is the view proposed in Part I that a MODU is a vessel in 
the context of on-platform accidental deaths or injuries but sheds 
that status when analyzed in the Macondo Tort setting. 
Earlier discussion disclosed Congress’s 1978 institution of its 
“new [OCSLA] statutory regime.” Combined in a single act were 
the additions of TADs alongside the “fixed structures” of 1953 and 
the title III prevention–liability regime, the precursor of the OPA 
’90 regime.  
The Conference Committee explained that the former clarified  
that federal law is to be applicable to all activities on all 
devices in contact with the seabed for exploration, 
development, and production. The committee intends that 
federal law is, therefore, to be applicable to activities on 
drilling ships, semi-submersible drilling rigs, and other 
watercraft, when they are connected to the seabed by 
                                                                                                             
 117. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(18), (22) (2006). 
 118. Id. § 2701(25). 
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drillstring, pipes, or other appurtenances, on the OCS for 
exploration, development, or production purposes. Ships 
and vessels are specifically not covered [only] when they 
are being used for the purpose of transporting OCS 
mineral resources.119 
The House described title III’s function as providing the 
“procedures to be followed in the event of an oilspill and 
compensation for cleanup costs and damages resulting from such a 
spill.”120 The title limits the definition of “vessels” to watercraft 
operating in OCS or territorial waters and which transport “oil 
directly from an offshore facility.”121 An “offshore facility,” it 
stated, is “any oil refinery, [or] drilling structure[,] . . . which is 
used to drill for, produce[,] . . . or transport oil produced from the 
Outer Continental Shelf . . . .”122 
These definitions exclude semisubmersibles as “vessels” by 
including them under “any drilling structure.” The term “vessel” is 
restricted to any watercraft used exclusively to “[transport] oil 
directly from an offshore facility.” Hence the statement of the 
conferees:  
[O]nce a drilling ship or other watercraft is attached to the 
seabed for exploration, development or production, it is to 
be considered an “offshore facility” rather than a vessel, 
for purposes of applying the differing requirements for a 
facility as compared to a vessel.123 
Congress’s goals for this strengthened regime, the 
amendment’s legislative history, and the unique OCSLA–OPA 
Macondo Tort action reinforce Judge DeMoss’s conclusion, if 
applied to the Macondo setting, that  
there is absolutely no question at all that these . . . changes 
eliminate the basis for any distinction which our case law 
may have made in the past between a “jack-up rig” being a 
vessel and a “fixed platform” not being a vessel, insofar as 
activities on the Outer Continental Shelf are concerned.124 
                                                                                                             
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 128 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1534 (emphasis added).  
 120. Id. at 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1584. 
 121. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-372, § 301(5), 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 
 122. Id. at § 301(8).  
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 179 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1585 (emphasis added).  
 124. Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 507 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(DeMoss, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard 
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In fact, OCSLA ’78’s section 1333(a), its title III OCS 
economic- and property-loss cause of action, and the latter’s 
refinement and expansion in OPA are not creatures of admiralty at 
all. They are instead independently grounded in the Constitution’s 
Property125 and Interstate and Foreign Commerce clauses,126 
respectively.  
B. OPA 1990 
Congress’s concurrent adoption of OPA and repeal of 
OCSLA’s title III injected definitional uncertainties not present in 
OCSLA ’78. These ambiguities are inventoried in Part IV’s lead 
paragraph, which also stresses that any claim that MODUs are 
“vessels” must contend with Congress’s decision to preserve 
OCSLA’s TAD language.  
Judges sharing the Circuit’s admiralty reflex, however, will 
conclude that these changes secure the Deepwater Horizon’s status 
as a “vessel.” As in B-1 Bundle, they will seize on the inclusion in 
OPA of a Stewart-duplicating definition of “vessel”127 and 
embrace even more tightly the half-century of Robison’s line of 
authority equating MODU-type rigs with “vessels.”128 Likewise, 
they will simply ignore the dissonance posed by MODUs’ 
unmodified status as OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) TADs129 and the 
categorical tone of the foregoing congressional explanation that 
                                                                                                             
 
Inc., v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009). Professor Robertson 
and B-1 Bundle disagree with Judge DeMoss’s assessment. See Robertson, 
supra note 2, at 345; B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 953 & n.4 (E.D. La. 
2011). However, like the Demette majority, neither undertakes to refute his 
position’s invocation of and reliance on OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s TAD 
language and the uncompromising additional support founded in the legislative 
history quoted supra text accompanying notes 119–24 and infra text 
accompanying notes 125–26. Sometimes, it appears, a statute is simply too 
inconvenient to merit attention. 
 125. “Congress,” the Senate’s Ad Hoc Committee stated in its report on the 
OCSLA ’78 amendments, “has a special constitutional responsibility to make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging 
to the United States” under the Property Clause. H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 54 
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461. 
 126. OCSLA, Judge Rubin has stated, “depends on national sovereignty and 
the commerce clause; the cause of action it creates is one arising out of a general 
federal statute, and federal court jurisdiction depends on the existence of a 
federal question.” Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102, 1107 n.12 (5th Cir. 
1982).  
 127. B-1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 950. 
 128. Id. at 949. 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 111–16.  
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“federal law is to be applicable [both] to all activities on all 
devices in contact with the seabed . . . ” and to MODUs when they 
“are connected to the seabed by drillstrings, pipes or other 
appurtenances.”  
For them, MODUs are hermaphrodites: both vessels and TADs 
at all times, hence pillars of admiralty jurisdiction.  
Or at least, that is the course that Judge Barbier championed in 
B-1 Bundle. But, in a subsequent MDL decision, he entertained the 
possibility that MODUs are hybrids.130 Recalling OPA’s treatment 
of MODUs as “vessels capable of use as offshore facilities,” and of 
offshore facilities as any facility “other than a vessel,” he reasoned 
that 
[a]s the words “other than a vessel” in [the OPA section 
2701(22) definition of “offshore facility”] indicate, vessels 
and offshore facilities typically are mutually exclusive 
categories. However, OPA provides a hybrid definition for 
MODUs: “‘mobile offshore drilling unit’ means a vessel . . . 
capable of use as an offshore facility.” In the MODU 
context, then, the responsible party is determined by how the 
MODU was used at the time of the incident . . . . When the 
MODU is not being used as an offshore facility––such as 
when it is moving from one drilling location to another—the 
MODU is treated as a vessel and the responsible party is the 
owner/operator of the MODU (the responsible party for a 
vessel). When the MODU is being used as an offshore 
facility––i.e., when the MODU is “exploring for, drilling for, 
producing, [etc.] . . . oil” “in , on, or under . . . navigable 
waters”––then the responsible party is the lessee (the 
responsible party for an offshore facility).131 
The issue before the court concerned a matter that falls outside 
of this Essay’s concerns.132 But directly relevant is the court’s 
                                                                                                             
 130. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D. La. 2012). 
 131. Id. at 750 (emphasis by Barbier, J.) (citations omitted). 
 132. The issue concerned the extent of Transocean’s liability for damages 
and response costs as a “responsible party” by virtue of its ownership of the 
Deepwater Horizon MODU. Transocean argued that section 2704(b)(1) limited 
its liability to that of a “tank vessel” (as set forth in OPA section 2704(a)(1)). In 
light of the hybrid default position endorsed by the court in language quoted in 
text, the Deepwater Horizon would not have been a “vessel” because it was 
being used as an “offshore facility” when the blowout occurred. But the court 
reasoned that OPA section 2704(b)(1) sets forth an exception in this case based 
on the section’s language that a MODU “which is being used as an offshore 
facility is deemed to be a tank vessel with respect to the discharge . . . of oil on 
or above the surface of the water.” Id. at 751. 
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seeming inclination to regard the hybrid concept for MODUs as 
the proper default interpretation. Fidelity to the court’s attention to 
“context” and to “how the MODU was used at the time of the 
incident” favors the hybrid over the hermaphrodite classification in 
evaluating the purported admiralty status of the Macondo OCSLA–
OPA tort. Because the Deepwater Horizon–MODU was being used 
as an “offshore facility–OCS offshore facility” when the blowout 
occurred, this second MDL opinion would seem not to favor the 
MODU’s classification as a “vessel.”  
Additional considerations support this interpretation. 
Beginning with the statute from which OPA’s “vessel” definition 
actually derives,133 Congress qualified the latter with a caveat 
calling for its application “unless the context indicates 
otherwise.”134 For the Macondo Tort, the context’s leading 
elements are the prior OCSLA ’78 “polluter pays” regime that 
OPA carried forward, section 1333(a)(1) and its intact TAD 
language, and congressional purposes driving Macondo’s tort–
economic loss cause of action.  
It is difficult to deny that the Macondo context does “indicate 
otherwise” because none of these elements favors dressing this 
decidedly nonadmiralty undertaking in admiralty whites. Judge 
Politz along with Judge Brown surely evidenced a more discerning 
awareness of context in their caution that “the term ‘vessel’ for 
Jones Act purposes . . . is [not] necessarily a vessel for other 
purposes as well.”135  
Treating MODUs as hybrids, moreover, does no harm to 
Robison’s longstanding goal of supporting injured or deceased 
platform workers. Judges remain free as they have been for a half 
century to deem the Deepwater Horizon a “vessel” in actions 
brought on behalf of its deceased or injured platform workers. 
But the reverse is not true. Endowing MODUs permanent 
vessel status even when they are functioning as nonvessels 
mandates admiralty law’s entrance even though its claim is likely 
to be weak or failing under either or both of Executive Jet’s tests. 
More immediate to the Macondo Tort, doing so has provided 
dubious support for B-1 Bundle’s related position observed 
earlier,136 that general maritime law has survived OCSLA and 
OPA largely unscathed.  
Considerably more plausible than the MODU-as-
hermaphrodite thesis is a two-step understanding of the linkage of 
                                                                                                             
 133. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). 
 134. Id. § 1 (emphasis added).  
 135. See supra text accompanying note 72.   
 136. See supra note 8. 
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the TAD language to OPA’s liability regime. The first 
acknowledges that OCSLA ’78 presented the TAD and title III 
amendments in an integrated OCSLA statutory format. The second 
recognizes that Congress split them in 1990, leaving the TAD 
element intact in OCSLA while drawing OCSLA’s former title III 
and similar liability provisions from three other oil pollution 
statutes within OPA. This understanding would carry forward to 
the post-1990 OCSLA–OPA, which combined the nonvessel 
concept of MODUs initiated in the OCSLA ’78 integration of the 
TAD language and title III.137 Certainly nothing in OPA’s 
legislative history suggests Congress’s desire to diminish rather 
than enhance the statutory punch of a combined OCSLA–OPA 
foundation for the Macondo Tort. 
Finally, Professor Robertson’s favored approach precipitates 
open warfare between OCSLA and OPA, in which one or the other 
must yield. Professor Robertson would discard OCSLA, moreover, 
on the basis of his claim that it has been repealed, presumably by 
judicially disfavored implication, because the statute is “older, less 
comprehensive, and less specific respecting oil spill liability.”138 
But there is no need to go down this path because 
accommodation is easily achieved under the hybrid approach. 
Professor Robertson’s awkward offering posits, moreover, that 
Congress expressly repealed one element of OCSLA––title III––at 
the same time that it implicitly repealed a second more salient 
provision––the 1333(a)(1) TAD language—which it recognized as 
central to its refashioning of oil pollution-discharge liability only 
12 years earlier. If Congress wished to cancel both elements, its 
obvious route was expressly to repeal both, rather than to leave 
repeal of the TAD language to the surmise of a future court. 
Likewise problematic are the grounds Professor Robertson 
cites for selecting OPA over OCSLA. Although OCSLA was 
originally adopted in 1953, Congress’s decision to leave the 1978 
section 1333(a)(1) intact occurred concurrently with OPA’s 
adoption in 1990. A claim of OCSLA’s lesser “specificity” makes 
sense, moreover, only if Professor Robertson’s equation of the 
Macondo blowout with a “vessel-related oil spill . . . into state 
waters” makes sense.139 But it does not. Reduction of the OCSLA 
blowout to this state-waters mode carries with it the astonishing 
consequence of vaporizing not only OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s 
TAD language but also the entirety of sections 1333(a)(1) and 
                                                                                                             
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
 138. Robertson, supra note 2, at 345. 
 139. Id. 
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1333(a)(2)(A), neither of which is operative for events originating 
in state waters.  
Likewise negated is the Supreme Court’s embrace of OCSLA 
as “defin[ing] a body of law applicable to the seabed, the subsoil 
and the . . . structures . . . on the Outer Continental Shelf.”140 
Finally, OPA’s near-total silence concerning the OCS141 
undermines the override claim by positioning OCSLA as the more 
specific statute on OCS matters and, hence, as an indispensable 
guide to its core concern, OCS resource extractive operations.  
 
                                                                                                             
 140. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969). 
 141. Excluding OPA’s “Outer Continental Shelf facility” definition and a 
single related provision, OPA section 2704(c)(3) (dealing with the allocation of 
financial liability as between such facilities and a “vessel”), OPA is silent 
concerning the OCS. 
